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Pattern as observation: Darwin’s ‘great facts’
of geographical distribution
Casey Helgeson∗†
ABSTRACT. Among philosophical analyses of Darwin’s Origin, a standard
view says the theory presented there had no concrete observational conse-
quences against which it might be checked. I challenge this idea with a
new analysis of Darwin’s principal geographical distribution observations
and how they connect to his common ancestry hypothesis.
1 Introduction
The simplest and most fundamental approaches to testing theories require the
theory to tell us what we should expect to observe in nature were that theory
correct (or more generally, how probable some observations would be, were the
theory correct). But according to most philosophical analyses, the theory Darwin
put forward in Origin of Species falls short of this standard. Were it true, as
Darwin claimed, that all species trace back to one or a few common ancestors,
and that natural selection is the primary means of modification, it wouldn’t fol-
low that tigers should have stripes, that grasses should have a wide geographical
distribution, or that beetles should be so prolific. As Kitcher (1985) diagnoses
the problem, the relation between Darwin’s theory and any observation is ‘doubly
loose’, since neither does the theory dictate the historical trajectory (genealogi-
cal, geographical, ecological) of any particular species or group, nor do hypotheses
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about such historical trajectories always tell us what we should expect to observe
in the present.
This apparent shortcoming introduces an interpretive problem that all philo-
sophical commentators must face. How can Darwin have made a good scientific
argument for his theory without having compared what actually obtains in nature
with what should be observed were his theory correct? The literature offers a va-
riety of solutions. Darwin’s theory is said to explain the observations collected in
the Origin, where the ‘explains’ relation is left unanalysed (Thagard; 1978; Recker;
1987; Hodge; 1991; Waters; 2003), or to fit the observations after post hoc adjust-
ment, where the assumptions used in the fitting are testable in principle (Lloyd;
1983; Recker; 1987), or, similarly, to provide a framework within which speculative,
yet ultimately testable, historical narratives (leading up to an observed event) can
be formulated (Kitcher; 1985, 1993, 2003). Darwin’s theory is then said to com-
pare favourably with the alternatives in virtue of one or more of the following:
the number of observations it can explain (or can be made to fit, or about which
a story can be told), the number of different kinds of observations explained, the
novelty of these kinds, the prior plausibility or familiarity of the causes cited in the
explanations (vera causa), and the economy with with the theory does so much
explaining.
Contrary to the premise of the interpretive problem posed above, I will argue
that Darwin’s theory, as presented in the Origin, did have straightforward obser-
vational consequences and that some of Darwin’s key observations report specific
facts that line up with what the theory says. While the analyses cited above each
illuminate aspects of Darwin’s long and complicated argument, they misrepresent
how Darwin’s theory relates to (at least some of) his supporting observations (and
consequently, how those observations might be said to support the theory).
The observations I have in mind are large-scale patterns observable in nature.
Existing philosophical analyses manage to describe how Darwin’s theory relates
to these broad, ‘high-level’ observations only by breaking them down into smaller
constituent observations and describing how the theory relates to each of the bits.
While the relation to each of the bits is indeed loose, I put this result down to an in-
felicitous decomposition of the large-scale pattern into the bite-sized observations.
The innovation in my analysis is a novel decomposition that works not by chopping
the big-picture observation into bits, but rather by disentangling the pattern from
the irrelevant details and then treating the pattern itself as the observation.
Specifically, I will address the biogeographical patterns discussed in the opening
pages of Darwin’s two chapters on geographical distribution. I will first describe
and unpack those observations, then attempt to derive them—or rather, the pat-
tern they instantiate—from Darwin’s theory. This derivation (qualitative, not
numbers and proofs) will not require all of Darwin’s theory; one part will do all
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the work, namely, Darwin’s main conclusion in the Origin: that diverse species
share common ancestry (Darwin; 1859/2003, 6). Darwin’s secondary conclusion,
that ‘Natural Selection has been the main but not exclusive means of modification’
(6) will have little to do here.
As my analysis of Darwin’s biogeographical observations will exemplify a more
general point about how hypotheses can connect to observations, I first introduce
the general point with a simple coin example.
2 A warm-up example
Suppose you receive two data sets, α and β, each reporting the outcomes of fifty
coin tosses. And suppose I tell you my hypothesis about the process that generated
those data: a single coin was tossed one hundred times, and α and β record
outcomes 1–50, and 51–100, respectively. My hypothesis is silent on whether the
coin is fair or biased; the chance of heads could be anywhere between zero and
one (but whatever it is, it is constant, and each toss is independent of the others).
Can my hypothesis be checked against these data?
Say the first entry in α is ‘heads’. How likely is this? My hypothesis does not
answer this question. Loosely speaking, it doesn’t say enough to do so. The same
goes for any individual entry in either data set. What about some more abstract
features of the data, such as the frequency of heads in α? This too depends on
the coin’s unknown probability of landing heads. And the same for the frequency
of heads in β, and in the total data α plus β. But consider an even more abstract
feature: the difference between the frequency of heads in α and that in β. My
hypothesis says that both data sets were generated by tossing the same coin, so
the frequency of heads in the two data sets should be roughly the same. This
prediction holds regardless of the coin’s (unknown) probability of landing heads.1
The moral of the story is that a hypothesis with nothing to say about any
individual observation can yet stick its neck out when it comes to more abstract
or ‘high level’ features of a set of observations. While familiar to statisticians, this
point is less well appreciated by philosophers of science and has been largely over-
looked in philosophical analyses of Darwin’s argument in the Origin. Darwin’s
theory doesn’t tell us what to expect when it comes to individual observations
about a particular species’ morphology or whereabouts. But it is a mistake to
1The probability distribution assigned to the statistic |frequencyα − frequencyβ | by the
binomial model for the total data set (that’s the technical name for my hypothesis) does depend
on the coin’s probability (θ) of landing heads (i.e., the statistic is not quite ancillary). But for
all θ, 0 is most probable and values greater than 0.2 are extremely improbable. This theory-
observation relationship can also be described in terms of a good cross-validation score (Forster;
2007) across a partition of the full data set into parts α and β.
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think that because the hypothesis makes no predictions about these ‘lower-level’
observations that it makes none about any ‘higher-level’, or comparative state-
ments about collections of such observations.2
3 Geographical distribution
Darwin opens chapter eleven with a pithy, big-picture review of what’s known
about the geographical distribution of living species. As Darwin sees it, the key
observations can be condensed into three ‘great facts’:
The first great fact which strikes us is, that neither the similarity nor the
dissimilarity of the inhabitants of various regions can be accounted for by
their climatal and other physical conditions. (346)
A second great fact which strikes us in our general review is, that barriers of
any kind, or obstacles to free migration, are related in a close and important
manner to the differences between the productions of various regions. (347)
A third great fact, partially included in the foregoing statements, is the
affinity of the productions of the same continent or sea, though the species
themselves are distinct at different points and stations.3 (349)
A page or two of discussion follows each fact, including a number of examples.
To illustrate the first of these facts, Darwin writes (see Figure 1):
In the southern hemisphere, if we compare large tracts of land in Australia,
South Africa, and western South America, between latitudes 25◦ and 35◦,
we shall find parts extremely similar in all their conditions, yet it would not
be possible to point out three faunas and floras more utterly dissimilar. (347)
What the example shows is that regions similar in terms of climate and physical
conditions need not host similar biotas. Darwin continues:
Or again we may compare the productions of South America south of lat.
35◦ with those of north of 25◦, which consequently inhabit a considerably
different climate, and they will be found incomparably more closely related
to each other, than they are to the productions of Australia or Africa under
nearly the same climate. (347)
2The example and lesson are adapted from Forster’s (1988) study of astronomical observa-
tions vis-a`-vis Newtonian mechanics. Also compare Sober’s (2008, 219) discussion of ‘shifting the
explanandum’ from single trait values to cross-species correlations when testing for adaptations.
3See Nelson (1978) for discussion of these observations (especially the first) in the work
of Darwin’s contemporaries and predecessors, including Linnaeus, Buffon, Candolle, Prichard,
Humboldt, and Lyell.
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Now Darwin has expanded the comparison by introducing a contrasting climate
within South America. Among the four regions compared, the most ‘closely re-
lated’ biota occupy the mismatched climates, not the similar ones. So the first fact
is reporting that when comparing regions, similarity of climate has no bearing on
similarity of biota. (I will shortly address what is meant by ‘similar’ or ‘closely
related’ biota.)
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Figure 1: A map illustrating three regions of the Southern Hemisphere between
latitudes 25◦ and 35◦; similar environments but contrasting flora and fauna.
In this example, the two South American regions are physically close to one
another. Is this important? Yes it is: the second great fact reports that barriers
to migration are ‘related in a close and important manner’ to differences between
regional biotas, which Darwin clarifies by noting the ‘great difference in nearly all
the terrestrial productions of the New and Old worlds’ and ‘between the inhabi-
tants of Australia, Africa, and South America under the same latitude: for these
countries are almost as much isolated from each other as is possible’ (347). The
same goes for marine fauna separated by ‘impassable barriers, either of land or of
open sea’ and to a lesser degree, for regional biota separated by ‘lofty and continu-
ous mountain ranges, . . . great deserts, and sometimes even large rivers’ (348). The
greater the barriers that separate two regions, the greater the differences between
their inhabitants.
The other side of the same coin is the similarity of inhabitants at different
points within an area undivided by barriers and therefore open to free migration.
These areas tend to coincide with the continents, or for marine life, the seas, and
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thus the third great fact: ‘the affinity of the productions of the same continent or
sea’.
All together then, the three great facts say roughly the following. When com-
paring the inhabitants of one region to those of another, more similar biota inhabit
regions that are more accessible through migration or dispersal, regardless of dif-
ferences in climate and physical conditions.
3.1 Similarity of inhabitants
But what does it mean to say the living things (‘inhabitants’, ‘productions’) of one
region are similar or dissimilar to those of another? How can such miscellaneous
collections be compared? One approach might be to judge similarity by the number
of species two biota have in common. But Darwin goes beyond this to recognise
similarity where ‘the species themselves are distinct’ (349). I read him as judging
two biotas similar to the degree that species found in one tend to be matched by
similar species in the other. In terms of an everyday example, two sets of cutlery
are similar since the fork in one looks much like the fork in the other; the same
for the spoon, the knife, and so on. In contrast, a set of hand tools is relatively
dissimilar, since a spanner is a strange looking fork, and a screwdriver a rather
dull and slender knife.
This first-pass analysis reduces similarity between biotas to similarity between
species, but what is species similarity? Darwin’s use of the terms ‘affinity’ (349)
and ‘related’ (349), as well as the phrase ‘species of the same genus’ (349) indicate
that he is thinking in taxonomic terms. The groups-within-groups structure of
biological classification partitions taxa into mutually exclusive groups, with each
group itself divided into subgroups, and so on for the subgroups.4 Groupings can
be written out using brackets, for example, ((human, chimpanzee) orangutan)
means that humans and chimps are each taxonomically closer to each other than to
orangutans. Such classifications express relative taxonomic relatedness—which is
closer to which—without saying how closely related the species are in any absolute
sense. (Taxonomic ranks such as family and genus appear to offer an absolute
yardstick for relatedness, but Darwin dismisses these ranks as arbitrary.)
So when Darwin says that the inhabitants of neighbouring regions of South
America are ‘incomparably more closely related to each other, than they are to
the productions of Australia or Africa,’ I take him to mean the following. Pick
4O’Hara (1991) divides taxonomic representations in the forty years prior to publication of
the Origin into the Quinarian (1819–1840), and mapmaking (1840–1859) periods. While there is
considerable diversity within each period, the primary structure in both is the nested grouping
as explained in the text. Quinarian classification requires exactly five subgroups within every
group and includes additional relationships that cross-cut the nested groupings. Some of what
O’Hara calls ‘maps’ also include supplementary cross-cutting relationships.
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any species from the one South American region, and then identify its closest
taxonomic relatives found in the other South American region and in the mooted
regions of Australia and Africa. Label the species sa, sa∗, au and af . With some
exceptions, the taxonomic relations among species selected in this way will gener-
ally be (sa, sa∗) au and (sa, sa∗) af . On this reading, each of Darwin’s statements
about the relative similarity of the ‘inhabitants’ of different regions can be un-
derstood as a summary of many smaller-scale facts about the taxonomic relations
among representative species drawn (as described above) from the biotas of those
regions.
3.2 Flightless birds, rodents
While Darwin discusses the great facts mainly in terms of the biota comparison
language that I have just interpreted, he also gives two examples at the more
detailed level of representative taxa. First example:
The plains near the Straits of Magellan are inhabited by one species of Rhea
(American ostrich), and northward the plains of La Plata by another species
of the same genus; and not by a true ostrich or emeu, like those found in
Africa and Australia under the same latitude. (349)
What is now called Darwin’s rhea inhabits the arid southern-most plains of South
America, while the greater rhea inhabits the plains somewhat to the north, in a
nearby region with a different climate. Their closest taxonomic relatives found in
corresponding regions of Africa and Australia are the ostrich and emu, respectively
(see Figure 2).
The two rheas are taxonomically more closely related to each other than either
is to the ostrich or the emu: (rh, rh) os, and (rh, rh) em. And the regions inhabited
by the two rheas are geographically more accessible to each other than either is
to Australia or southern Africa. The relative accessibility between regions is thus
mirrored in the taxonomic relations between closely related species that inhabit
those regions.
This is what the great facts look like when viewed in terms of particular species.
More precisely, the taxonomic relations between the rheas, ostrich and emu show
one instance of the general trend of closest taxonomic relations from accessible
regions being more closely related than those inhabiting relatively inaccessible re-
gions (regardless of similarity/disimilarity between regional environments). Many
such instances, featuring the same four regions, are summarised in Darwin’s state-
ment that the ‘productions’ of neighbouring South American regions are ‘more
closely related to each other, than they are to the productions of of Australia or
Africa under nearly the same climate’.
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Figure 2: A map illustrating Darwin’s flightless birds example; the two species of
rhea are geographical neighbours as well as close taxonomic relations.
Darwin’s second ground-level example addresses a group of South American
rodents and their more widely dispersed taxonomic relatives:
On these same plains of La Plata, we see the agouti and bizcacha, animals
having nearly the same habits as our hares and rabbits and belonging to
the same order of Rodents,5 but they plainly display an American type of
structure. We ascend the lofty peaks of the Cordillera and we find an alpine
species of bizcacha; we look to the waters, and we do not find the beaver or
musk-rat, but the coypu and capybara, rodents of the American type. (349)
You might have thought, says Darwin, that South American lakes and rivers
would hold beaver or muskrat as in Europe and North America; but instead
we find the coypu or capybara (depending on the region), which are taxonomi-
cally more closely related to each other and to neighbouring rabbit-like rodents,
the agouti and viscacha: (ago, vis, coy, cap) bea,mus.6 Comparing the regional
5Rabbits and hares were moved out of Rodentia and into the sister order Lagomorpha in the
early 20th century. This development doesn’t undermine Darwin’s argument. (There are closer
taxonomic relations in Europe and America, but these are still taxonomically more distant than
the South American rodents are to each other.)
6Partial classifications such as (abcd)ef leave open where additional groupings should go,
and can be read as disjunctions of all compatible group structures. In this case, the ef could be
further specified as (·)(ef), ((·)e)f , or ((·)f)e, and the internal structure of (abcd) could be any
of fifteen possibilities, e.g. ((ab)(cd)), ((ad)(bc)), or ((a(b(cd))).
8
rodents of South America to Europe’s hares and rabbits gives the same result:
(ago, vis, coy, cap)har, rab.
The point, as in the previous example, is that closest taxonomic relatives found
in neighbouring, accessible regions are more closely related than those found in
inaccessible regions further afield—in this case North America and Europe. Here
Darwin has chosen the example to further illustrate the robustness of this gen-
eralisation: it holds up despite coypu and capybara sharing a station (roughly,
an ecological niche) with the beaver and muskrat, and despite agouti and vis-
cacha having nearly the same habit (superficial external appearance) as hares and
rabbits. He adds, concerning South America, that ‘Innumerable other instances
could be given’, and more broadly, ‘It is a law of the widest generality, and every
continent offers innumerable instances’ (349).
3.3 Explanation
What is the significance of the great facts? Darwin initially makes no comment on
the irrelevance of environment, though he later leverages this point against what
he calls the ‘theory of creation’. His immediate concern is instead the observed
association between taxonomic relatedness and geographical accessibility. Speak-
ing of the ‘bond’ connecting species within the same continent or sea, or otherwise
inhabiting regions easily accessible by migration, Darwin says, ‘This bond, on my
theory, is simply inheritance, that cause which alone, as far as we positively know,
produces organisms quite like, or, as we see in the case of varieties nearly like each
other’ (350).
Darwin’s theory thus provides, loosely speaking, an explanation: geographical
proximity (accessibility) and taxonomic similarity go together because both are
consequences of recent common ancestry. What I aim to show next is that this
connection between accessibility and taxonomy is in fact a direct consequence
of Darwin’s common ancestry hypothesis—not merely something the hypothesis
can accommodate, or make sense of, after the fact, with additional posits and
assumptions.
4 Darwin’s hypothesis
Darwin’s common ancestry hypothesis says that all living things trace back to at
most a handful of original species. But this, I will argue, is not all that it says.
To understand the additional content, we must delve a bit deeper into the topic
of taxonomy.
Groups-within-groups classifications like those seen above express relative tax-
onomic ‘relatedness’, but what does that really mean? What is classification ulti-
9
mately about? Minimally, a given classification was both a summary of observed
morphological similarities, and a predictive hypothesis regarding similarities in
traits not yet observed, or not taken into account in making the classification. Be-
yond this superficial agreement, different naturalists had different ideas about the
true nature of taxonomic relations. Gazing at a taxonomy, some saw a creator’s
blueprint, others, a map of the physiologically possible adult forms, or of the con-
straints inherent in the process of embryological development (Winsor; 2009). Yet
others saw a genealogical tree—at least at the lowest taxonomic ranks: varieties
within a species, and perhaps even species within a genus.
Despite these differences, taxonomists’ methods were similar enough opera-
tionally that they could and often did agree on how to classify, even while dis-
agreeing about the ultimate meaning of the classification. As Winsor (2009, 44)
explains, ‘To us it may seem paradoxical that naturalists should use the word “re-
lated” without agreeing on its meaning, but actually this tolerance enabled them
to make progress as a scientific community.’ Think of ethical claims in philosophy
today: two philosophers can agree that ‘murder is wrong’, even while entertaining
different theories about what it means for an act to be wrong. They agree on
an ethical claim while disagreeing about meta-ethics. Naturalists before Darwin
could and often did agree on classification claims even as they disagreed about (so
to speak) meta-classification.
To further explore the genealogical interpretation, note that every groups-
within-groups classification can also be represented, without loss of information,
as a branching tree structure (Figure 3). Most naturalists already believed that
subgroups within the same species were related genealogically; in terms of the tree
representation, this means that some forks at the very tips of the branches were
taken to indicate genealogical relations. Nodes deeper in the tree, however, were
given one of the other interpretations. Darwin took the genealogical interpretation
and pushed it all the way down the tree. All (or almost all) living things are related
by genealogy, he said, and the closer the taxonomic relation, the more recent the
shared ancestor.
a (b c) a (b (c d)) (a b) (c d)
Figure 3: Example classifications and their corresponding (rooted) trees.
Darwin’s common ancestry hypothesis is best understood as an interpretation
of taxonomic relations, namely the genealogical interpretation just presented. The
hypothesis says that all living things trace back to one or a few common ancestor
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species, that the ancestry of life has the form of a branching tree, and that the shape
of this tree is revealed (at least approximately) in the taxonomic classifications of
Darwin’s time.
4.1 Deriving the observations
Darwin’s view of taxonomic relations goes together with treating the practice of
taxonomy as a (disguised) method of what is now called phylogenetic inference, or
inferring the genealogical tree for a set of taxa. Indeed, the practice was largely
accurate as a method of phylogenetic inference (assuming the results of today’s
molecular-based methods are not too far off the mark). As I will now show,
the geography side of the great-facts observations can be given a phylogenetic
gloss as well. This new perspective will illuminate the connection between those
observations and Darwin’s common ancestry hypothesis.
The association between geography and taxonomy expressed by the great facts
consists of innumerable instances of the pattern seen in the cases of the rodents and
flightless birds, in which taxonomic relations among species mirror the geographical
accessibility of the regions they inhabit. The geographical observations included
within any instance of this pattern can be summarised by grouping together the
accessibly-located species, and applying the bracket notation used above to express
taxonomic relations. In the case of the flightless birds, for example, this gives:
(rh, rh) os, em.
This grouping approach to summarising geographic accessibility relations is for-
mally the same as applying a simple method of tree construction (e.g. neighbour-
joining, or UPGMA) to a matrix of pair-wise genetic or character ‘distances’ (Ta-
ble 1). By another application of the one-to-one correspondence between nested
groupings and branching trees, we can view the geography-based grouping proce-
dure as a second method of phylogenetic inference. I will address the method’s
reliability shortly, but as a first step, note that it does have a sound rationale:
species that split further in the past have had more time to disperse further apart,
while species that split more recently can’t have gotten too far apart since speci-
ation.7
The pattern observed in the cases of the rodents and flightless birds can now
be described as agreement between taxonomic and geography-based groupings for
the same set of species. In the case of the flightless birds, taxonomy and geography
agree on the placement of the two rheas within a subgroup of their own (Table 2).
In the case of the rodents, they agree on the placement of the agouti, viscacha,
coypu, and capybara into a subgroup that excludes beaver, muskrat, hares and
7For a more formal argument, see Sober’s probabilistic reconstruction (Sober; 2008, 326) of
Darwin’s ‘space-time principle’ (Darwin; 1859/2003, 410).
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Table 1: Pairwise migratory accessibility (using cartoon numbers) arranged to
display the formal identity with a matrix of pair-wise character ‘distances’.
rabbits.
taxonomy: ((Darwin’s rhea, greater rhea) emu) ostrich
geography: (Darwin’s rhea, greater rhea) ostrich, emu
Table 2: Agreement between taxonomic and geography-based groupings for a set
of species. ‘Innumerable instances’ of this pattern add up to the trend reported
by the ‘great facts’ of geographical distribution.
And having given a phylogenetic, or genealogical, interpretation to both the
taxonomic and the geography-based groupings, there is now a simple reason why
the agreement seen in Table 2 should be the rule and not the exception. On
Darwin’s theory, these two ways of grouping should generally come to the same
result because they are in fact two approaches to estimating the very same thing:
the true genealogical tree for the species in question.
But is geography-based tree construction really a workable method of phy-
logenetic inference? After all, geographical accessibility is typically a dreadful
proxy for genealogical relatedness. For example, the American bison is much more
closely related to the Asian water buffalo than to the rodents, birds, grasses, and
ants in its own environment. For almost any choice of taxa, judging genealogical
relatedness based on geographical accessibility would do no better than putting
all possible trees into a hat and reaching in blindfolded.
While grouping by geographic accessibility is indeed a very limited method
of phylogenetic inference, there is a narrow set of circumstances under which it
can succeed. Geographic distribution contains information about genealogical re-
lations, but the world is small and migration is fast. The noise of dispersal quickly
obscures the signal of genealogy.8 Geographical accessibility will be most informa-
tive about genealogy where speciations have occurred recently (on an evolutionary
8Somewhat more formally, and supposing that daughter species disperse via probabilistically
independent random walks, the likelihood function over possible trees flattens quickly.
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time scale), such that dispersal has yet to fully shuﬄe species’ locations. And
differences in accessibility between the regions that species occupy will be most
justifiably attributed to speciation order (rather than to accidents of dispersal)
where those differences are great.
Not accidentally, both conditions are satisfied in the range of cases comprised
by Darwin’s great facts. Darwin’s biota comparison statements each summarise
innumerable smaller-scale, species-specific observations of the type exemplified by
the rodents and flightless birds, each of which concerns a set of species that are
each other’s closest taxonomic relatives native to the regions in question. On the
genealogical interpretation of taxonomic relations, this means that all speciations
will have been relatively recent, satisfying the first condition. And Darwin’s focus
on contrasting regional biotas within the same continent or sea with those on
separate continents or seas ensures that differences in geographical accessibility
between compared regions will be very great, satisfying the second condition.
Thus the way in which the regions are chosen for comparison, and then the way
in which representative species are chosen from those regions, works to restrict
circumstances to those under which geographical distribution is most informa-
tive about genealogical relations. And even under these favourable circumstances,
geography-based tree-construction need not be terribly reliable. It must only be
reliable enough to typically agree with the anatomy-based taxonomic trees in the
limited sense that same-continent species will belong to a taxonomic subgroup that
excludes their different-continent cousins. It then follows from Darwin’s genealogi-
cal interpretation of biological taxonomy that regional biotas from neighbouring, or
geographically accessible, regions will be, as Darwin reports, more ‘closely related’
than either is to a third, geographically isolated biota. If we can use ‘predicts’ in
the atemporal sense, then Darwin’s theory predicts this observation.
4.2 Analogy with the coin example
I began by suggesting that the standard view about Darwin’s theory having no con-
crete observational consequences flows in part from misplaced attention to overly
specific, ‘low-level’ observations rather than ‘higher-level’ patterns of such obser-
vations. And I presented the coin example to illustrate a particular way in which
a theory can renounce all commitments about the former and yet stick its neck
out regarding the latter. Now I clarify the analogy between the coin example and
Darwin’s biogeography observations.
Recall that because the single-coin hypothesis says nothing about the coin’s
bias, it suggests nothing about the outcome of any single toss of the coin, nor
about the frequency of heads in either of data sets α or β. It does, however, predict
that the frequency of heads in α and β should be roughly the same, because the
underlying bias of the coin, whatever it is, is constant across the two data sets.
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Indeed, the frequency of heads in α and in β each constitute a best (maximum
likelihood) estimate of that bias.
The geography-based grouping operation sketched above can be thought of
as a statistic summarising the geographical distribution observations for a set of
species. Similarly, taxonomic practice can be viewed as a set of operations applied
to comparative morphology observations and producing a summary statistic of
the species’ morphology. The ‘highest-level’ observation is then the agreement
between these two groupings; this is the analogue of similar frequencies of heads
observed in data sets α and β.9 And like the two frequencies vis-a`-vis the single-
coin hypothesis, the taxonomic and geography-based groupings can, on Darwin’s
common ancestry hypothesis, be interpreted as two estimates of a single theoretical
entity posited to underly both data sets.
Viewing any given species in isolation, Darwin’s theory has nothing to say
about where it should be found on the globe, or what morphological character-
istics it should display. Backing up to take in the geographical distribution of a
whole collection species, the theory makes no commitment on their locations or
even relative positions, if geography is viewed in isolation from morphology. But
the comparison of taxonomic and geography-based trees leaves behind all of these
details that go beyond the theory’s commitments, to find a more abstract, compar-
ative feature of the total morphology-plus-geography observation set about which
the theory takes a stand.
From a logical point of view, the step from a full set of geography and morphol-
ogy observations to a summary statement that merely reports agreement between
geography- and morphology-based groupings involves a logical weakening. The to-
tal observations entail the agreement statement, but not the other way around.
This is what explains the newfound connection between theory and observation:
the theory doesn’t say enough to comment on the full observations in all their
richness, but by logically weakening the observations, their content is trimmed
back to the bigger-picture relational features on which the theory speaks. (The
alternative strategy, and the one employed in other commentaries on the Origin,
is to forge a connection between theory and observation by logically strengthen the
hypothesis, by adding to it extra posits and assumptions, so that its consequences
expand to include the specific, local observations.)
5 Conclusion
I have offered a new analysis of the principal observations cited in Darwin’s treat-
ment of geographical distribution in the Origin, and of how those observations
9Quantitative measures of tree similarity (Robinson and Foulds; 1981; Penny et al.; 1982;
Penny and Hendy; 1985) might allow for an even tighter analogy.
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relate to Darwin’s theory. My analysis challenges the conventional wisdom that
his theory does not, on its own, tell us what we should expect to observe in nature
were the theory correct. The novelty of my analysis comes from a re-examination—
in the light of the coin example—of the biogeographic trend expressed by what
Darwin calls the ‘great facts’ of geographical distribution. Too much emphasis
on the geographical trajectories of particular species makes Darwin’s theory ap-
pear vacant or overly flexible. On my reading, the key observation is the pattern,
repeated across regions and environments, of agreement between taxonomic and
geography-based groupings for appropriately chosen groups of species.
This has not been an assessment of how or how much the analysed biogeo-
graphical trend supports or confirms Darwin’s theory, nor how it fits into his
overall argument running through the Origin. I have focussed on the form and
content of Darwin’s observations rather than on particular philsophical theories of
evidence or confirmation. That said, the relatively direct connection revealed here
between Darwin’s theory and observations does remove some of the motivation
for the more indirect approaches to justifying or rationalising Darwin’s argument
cited above in my introduction. And the fact that natural selection has remained
idle in the preceding analysis should encourage readings of Darwin’s argument on
which much of his evidence supports common ancestry without weighing in on
the mechanism of evolution (Waters; 2003; Sober; 2011) over treatments that see
Darwin building a case for a single, undecomposed theory (Hodge; 1992; Recker;
1987; Sintonen; 1990; Lloyd; 1983; Thagard; 1978).
My analysis also places Darwin’s observations in the context of modern evo-
lutionary biology by framing and conceptualising the great facts in a way that
allows for application of a familiar label. The agreement between genealogical
trees inferred from different data sets will be recognised by contemporary evolu-
tionary biologists as a form of phylogenetic congruence, as used in contemporary
phylogenetic systematics (Huelsenbeck et al.; 1996), historical biogeography (Wi-
ley; 1988), symbiotic evolution (Funk et al.; 2000), and several other subfields.
The congruences discussed here, however, are different in that the second tree is
based on geographical accessibility, whereas modern instances of phylogenetic con-
gruence compare two trees each based on intrinsic features of the organisms, either
morphology or genetic data.
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